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Abstract: Whilst the ongoing banking regulatory reforms towards a comprehensive Basel III 
framework emphasise bank transparency, disclosure and a competitive banking market 
environment, very little is known about the empirical relationship between bank opacity and 
banking competition. We investigate the impact of competition, as measured by the 
LQGLYLGXDOEDQN¶VSULFLQJSRZHULQWKHEDQNLQJPDUNHW on bank opacity using a large sample 
of US bank holding companies over the 1986-2015 period. We uncover new evidence, on 
the competition-bank opacity nexus, which suggests that banks with higher market power 
DQGRSHUDWLQJLQOHVVFRPSHWLWLYHEDQNLQJPDUNHWVKDYHORZHUDQDO\VWV¶IRUHFDVWHUURUV
and dispersions and may thus be less opaque. This effect is more pronounced for the 
2007-09 global financial crisis period. 2XUHYLGHQFHLVUREXVWWRFRQWUROOLQJIRUDQDO\VWV¶
characteristics, bank fixed-effects and endogeneity problems. 
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1. Introduction 
The ongoing banking regulatory reforms, especially the comprehensive Basel III framework, place 
major emphasis on disclosure, transparency and competition within the global banking sector.2 
Indeed, interest in bank opacity and competition has arguably become more intense in 
recent years due to reasons which include the 2007-09 global financial crisis, the 
LQFUHDVLQJFRPSOH[LW\RIEDQNV¶EXVLQHVVPRGHOVDQGWKHG\QDPLFVRIEDQNV¶EHKDYLRXU
in response to changes in competitive pressures and regulations (e.g., Verrecchia, 1983, 
1990; Shleifer and Vishny 1997; Clinch and Verrecchia 1997; Zhao et al., 2013). In 
particular, the 2007-09 financial crisis was notably attributed to poor practices relating to 
lack of disclosure, transparency and fair competition among the major global banks. For 
instance, the LIBOR (London Interbank Offered Rate) scandal that only emerged recently 
has been identified as one of the major causes of the 2007-09 financial crisis (Burton, 
2018; Vaughan and Finch, 2017). In the main, it shows the extent to which senior bankers 
and traders of the major global banks colluded and connived to rig the LIBOR in their 
favour, in blatant disregard for banking and trading rules (Vaughan and Finch, 2017). 
This and many other opaque banking practices have recently been discovered, often 
resulting in criminal prosecutions, fines and long-term imprisonments (Burton, 2018; 
Vaughan and Finch, 2017). 
Consequently, the link among disclosure, transparency and competition within the 
banking system has received considerable attention from regulators, policy makers and 
practitioners (Anolli et al., 2014; Blau et al., 2017; Boubakri et al., 2015; Bushman et al., 
2016). Observably, interest in issues of disclosure, transparency and competition partly 
stems from the fact that banks remain relatively more opaque than non-bank firms 
(Morgan, 2002; Flannery et al., 2013; Blau et al., 2017). However, empirical studies 
examining the association between opacity and competition within the baking sector are 
rare (Blau et al., 2017; Fosu et al., 2017). The few existing studies also suffer from a 
number of observable limitations (e.g., Blau et al., 2017; Jiang et al., 2016; Jones et al., 
2012). For instance, Blau et al. (2017) examine how changes in competition through 
                                                     
2Specifically, Basel III requires enhanced disclosures on the detail of the components of regulatory capital and 
their reconciliation to the reported accounts, including a comprehensive explanation of how a bank calculates its 
regulatory capital ratios. Please see the summary of the key aspects of the Basel framework, especially the market 
discipline component with the revised pillar 3 disclosure requirements, available at 
https://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3/b3summarytable.pdf [last accessed on 03 May 2018].  
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regulatory reduction of entry barriers influenced the level and tone of voluntary 
disclosures, but failed to address the competition effect on the quality of information that 
banks release. Similarly, Jiang et al. (2016) investigated the impact of regulatory reforms 
that improved banking competition on bank opacity and found that greater competition 
reduces bank opacity. A major limitation of their analysis, however, is that their measures 
of bank opacity were restricted to information that is traditionally captured by the 
financial statements such as loan loss provisions. Thus, bank opacity emanating from 
other sources, such as the LIBOR scandal, is unlikely to be reflected in their empirical 
proxies for bank opacity. Of closer relevance to our study is Fosu et al. (2017), who 
utilised a much broader, market-based (analyst forecast) set of measures of bank opacity 
to analyse how competition and opacity impact bank stability. They, however, fell short 
of directly examining how competition affects bank opacity. 
Consequently, in this paper, we seek to contribute to the existing literature by providing 
new evidence on the relationship between competition and bank opacity by invoking the 
informativeness of analysts¶ forecast properties (errors and dispersions) and employing a non-
structural measure of competition that also directly reveals bank-level market/pricing 
power. By employing DQDO\VWV¶ IRUHFDVWSURSHUWLHV DVRXURSDFLW\PHDVXUHZH DYRLG WKH
limitations of the accounting-based measures such as susceptibility to manipulations by 
managers (Dichev et al., 2013), and being backward-looking (historical), and thus unable to 
fully reflect current and future asset opacity (Burks et al., 2017).  Although private 
information is generally unavailable to a vast array of capital market participants, analysts 
can use their expertise to derive private information from public information, as well as 
use their special access to management to obtain privileged information (Keskek et al., 
2017). $V D UHVXOW DQDO\VWV¶ IRUHFDVW SURSHUWLHV VXFK DV HDUQLngs forecast errors and 
dispersions can arguably provide a more superior and direct estimate of bank opacity.  
:HXVHµEDQNRSDFLW\¶DVDQHQFRPSDVVLQJWHUPWRUHIHUWRWKHLQKHUHQWFRPSOH[LWLHVDQG
difficulties that impede the ability of outsiders (e.g., investors) to fully understand, 
evaluate and monitor the operations and assets of banks (e.g., Dewally and Shao, 2013; 
Flannery et al., 2013). The challenges to bank monitoring that are associated with opacity 
may emanate from reasons that include limited transparency and disclosures by banks, as 
well as the inherently risky nature of banking business. Since financial analysts tend to 
be industry specialists, who serve as information intermediaries between firms and 
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market participants (Boubakri et al., 2015; Keskek et al., 2017), we expect analysts of banks 
to possess an advantage in understanding the complex banking operations. However, if 
banks are indeed opaque, then, even expert bank analysts may struggle to make accurate 
SUHGLFWLRQVDERXWEDQNV¶ earnings based on the existing public and private information 
available to them. Hence, we follow Fosu et al. (2017) by relying on the informativeness 
of analysts¶ forecast errors and dispersions as our empirical gauge of the extent of bank 
opacity. Different from Fosu et al. (2017), however, we examine the potential drivers of 
bank opacity (specifically, the extent of banking competition, as inferred from bank-level 
pricing power), rather than its consequence on bank stability.  
Another important extension that we seek to make to the literature is to consider the role 
of financial crisis in shaping the competition-opacity nexus. This analysis is motivated 
by the view that monitoring incentives and information availability on financial firms, 
and thus bank opacity, may vary over time (i.e., in crisis vs. normal times) (e.g., Flannery 
et al., 2013; Simkovic, 2013). For example, Flannery et al. (2013) show that, while banks 
are not unusually more opaque than their non-bank peers in normal periods, they become 
significantly more opaque during crisis periods. Within the context of the competition 
effect on bank opacity, Simkovic (2013) contends that competition in the US mortgage 
VHFXULWVDWLRQPDUNHWIXHOOHGWKHUHFHQWILQDQFLDOFULVLVE\XQGHUPLQLQJVHFXULWLVHUV¶DELOLty 
to monitor mortgage originators. This suggests that bank opacity may be considered to be 
a more serious problem in competitive markets during crisis periods. To the best of our 
knowledge and based on our extensive review of the literature, we are the first to explore 
the moderating role of financial crisis in the context of the competition-opacity literature. 
Jiang et al. (2016), Burks et al. (2017) and Fosu et al. (2017), which are the closest studies 
to the current paper, all fail to explore how the presence of crisis may moderate or 
accentuate the impact of competition on bank opacity.  
Our results, which are based on a large sample of 610 US bank holding companies over 
the 1986-2015 period, are as follows. We find that banks with greater market power, and 
hence operating in less competitive banking markets, are associated with lower bank 
opacity. In other words, the presence (absence) of intense competition in banking markets 
seems to increase (decrease) bank opacity. We further find this effect to persist over time, 
albeit it became more pronounced during the recent 2007-09 financial crisis. These results 
are robust to controlling for potential endogeneity problems that could arise from the 
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simultaneity of bank opacity and competition. Further, our findings remain robust to 
FRQWUROOLQJ IRU DQDO\VWV¶ FKDUDFWHULVWLFV such as firm-specific and general industry 
experience or knowledge. Finally, our findings remain unchanged when we control for 
both unobserved firm- and state-quarter fixed-effects, as well as when we utilise a market-
level measure of competition.  
In the process, we make several new contributions to the existing literature. First, we provide 
the first evidence of the effect of banking market competition on bank opacity derived 
IURPDQDO\VWV¶forecast properties. Second, we depart from the existing literature on the 
opacity-competition nexus by employing a direct measure of competition at the bank level 
WKURXJKLQGLYLGXDOEDQN¶VPDUNHWSRZHU, proxied by the Lerner Index, with marginal costs 
derived from a stochastic cost frontier rather than from accounting numbers in the 
financial statements. The Lerner index is commonly utilised in the banking literature as a 
proxy for competition in banking markets (e.g., Beck et al., 2013; Anginer et al., 2014), but 
has not yet been applied to opacity. Finally, we disentangle the effect of the 2007-09 
financial crisis on the relationship between competition and bank opacity by showing that 
banks behave differently during crisis periods, possibly due to the intense distress 
imposed by such crises (e.g., Flannery et al., 2013; Blau et al., 2017). This underscores 
the need to highlight the moderating role of financial crises which has so far been ignored 
in the literature. 
The results of our study are of policy and practical relevance to policy makers, regulators, 
analysts, and other market participants. For instance, from a policy and regulatory 
perspective, our key finding implies that, with banking markets across the globe 
becoming increasingly competitive and innovative, there is the need to vigorously pursue 
moves to foster increased disclosure and transparency in banks if we are to achieve any 
meaningful market discipline. In this regard, our findings lend support to the Basel III 
regulatory framework that seeks to achieve higher levels of market discipline, disclosure 
and transparency by improving uniformity and full GLVFORVXUHRIEDQNV¶FDSLWDOEDVHDQG
leverage ratios.   
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents a review of the relevant 
literature. Section 3 discusses the empirical estimation methods, the data and variables used 
for the study. The empirical results are presented in Section 4, whilst Section 5 concludes 
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2. Related literature  
In this section, we first explore the key reasons as to why banks may be associated with higher 
opacity. This helps to clarify the concept of bank opacity, as well as highlight the fundamental 
channels through which banking market competition could potentially impact bank opacity. 
We also review the literature on the linkage between opacity and competition and derive our 
hypothesis.  
2.1 Why are banks opaque? 
Although opacity of balance sheets is a common corporate feature across all industries, 
banks are generally regarded to be more opaque than other types of firms (e.g., Morgan, 
2002; Flannery et al., 2013; Blau et al., 2017). For instance, Flannery et al. (2013) assess 
the relative opaqueness of banking firms and observe some evidence that suggests that banks 
are unusually more opaque than a sample of matched non-banking firms, particularly during 
crisis periods. Similarly, Blau et al. (2017) document that banks exhibit significant stock price 
delays/inefficiencies relative to matched non-bank firms, suggesting that stock investors are 
either less informed about bank assets or, perhaps, struggle to fully comprehend banking 
operations.  
Early research by Morgan (2002) attributes the opacity of the financial sector to the 
specialty of bank assets and the high leverage that banks employ. He notes that EDQNV¶
assets (loans and trading assets, in particular) have risks that are hard to observe, but easy 
to change, resulting in a higher uncertainty over banks. Moreover, the presence of high 
leverage in banks invites agency problems, thereby compounding the uncertainty over 
EDQNV¶ DVVHWV Relating opacity to agency problems (specifically, managerial 
misbehaviour), Beatty et al. (2002) DUJXHWKDWPDQDJHUV¶LQFHQWLYHs to extract private rent 
can cause them to engage in earnings management and, in the process, increase bankV¶ 
opacity. They further offer empirical evidence to suggest that banks engage in earnings 
management either to reduce their tax liabilities or to circumvent regulations on capital 
requirements. 
Later studies have also attempted to relate financial innovations to bank opacity. In WagQHU¶V
(2007) theoretical model in which managers have the incentive to avoid market discipline, 
managers use complex financial instruments such as derivatives to make their activities more 
difficult to monitor. Consistent with the prediction of this model, Dewally and Shao (2013) 
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find that financial derivatives (specifically, interest rate and foreign exchange derivatives) 
diminish the transparency of ODUJH 86 EDQN KROGLQJ FRPSDQLHV¶ balance sheets, thereby 
making them more opaque. Overall, it seems that the relatively higher degree of opacity in 
banks stems from three main sources: (i) the inherently greater risks associated with their 
balance sheets, particularly their assets; (ii) the higher risk of financial statement manipulation 
by bank managers, perhaps to circumvent regulatory requirements; and (iii) the complexity of 
financial innovations, possibly to frustrate market discipline.  
Whatever the cause of opacity in the banking sector, there is virtually no disagreement 
regarding its potential devastating effects on the financial system. Fosu et al. (2017) document 
that opacity increases insolvency risks among banks. Beyond the effect on individual banks, 
Jones et al. (2012) suggest that opacity has the potential to threaten the entire banking system 
because it may cause price contagion in the market which may lead to financial instability and 
systemic risk. Further, Dewally and Shao (2013) note that, when banks are unusually opaque, 
market-based discipline may fail as market participants are not able to monitor and discipline 
EDQNV¶ ULVN-taking behaviour. Arguably, the far-reaching consequences of bank opacity 
provide a justification for tighter regulation of banks. However, the banking sector in most 
advanced economies, particularly the US, has increasingly been deregulated (Jiang et al., 
2016; Burks et al., 2017), with implications for competition and opacity in banks. We, 
therefore, turn our attention to the literature on the relationship between competition and 
opacity to further explore this matter.     
2.2 Competition and bank opacity 
To the extent that competition in the banking market may influence factors such as the nature 
of assets that banks choose to hold, and managerial incentives to manipulate financial 
statements, as well as encourage banks to develop complex financial innovations, it is 
plausible to expect competition (or market power) to be related to bank opacity. 
Surprisingly, studies on this topic have focused largely on non-bank firms, with mixed 
conclusions (e.g., Datta, Iskandar-Datta, and Singh, 2013; Markarian and Santalo, 2014; 
Balakrishnan and Cohen, 2013). Although the literature thus far lacks a clear prediction or 
conclusion on the effect of competition on firm opacity, it at least points to potential 
FKDQQHOVWKURXJKZKLFKFRPSHWLWLRQRULQGLYLGXDOILUP¶VPDUNHWSRZHUPD\LQFUHDVHRU
decrease bank opacity. Competition can impact on bank opacity mainly through two 
broad channels: (i) the earnings management and disclosure channel; and (ii) the 
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innovation channel. 
The often-cited channels through which competition impacts opacity are the risk of 
financial statement manipulation and/or the willingness (or the lack of it) to disclose 
quality information about the firm to outside stakeholders. Theoretically, competition can 
improve internal corporate governance (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997), as well as serve as a 
mechanism for exercising external discipline on management (Nickell, 1996), and thereby 
reducing discretionary earnings management and improving information disclosure 
(Leuz et al., 2003). Also, by facilitating market entry, competition can foster effective 
peer benchmarking, which can help in extracting or verifying information about 
individual banks within the industry (Darrough and Stoughton, 1990; Holmstrom, 1982; 
Dichev et al., 2013). )XUWKHUPRUH 'DUURXJK DQG 6WRXJKWRQ¶V  model of an entry 
game suggests that greater competition from potential entrants in an industry leads to 
greater disclosure by incumbent firms, since the disclosure of µEDG QHZV¶ E\ WKH
incumbent can deter potential entrants to the market, whilst the disclosure of positive 
information would reduce the incumbent ILUP¶V cost of capital. Similarly, Wagenhofer 
(1990) suggests that increased competition can lead to full information disclosure. 
Overall, the above theoretical arguments suggest less (more) opacity for banks in 
competitive (concentrated) markets since competition can reduce earnings management 
and also improve quality information disclosure. Some existing empirical studies provide 
evidence to support this position. Balakrishnan and Cohen (2013¿QGWKDWFRQFHQWUDWHGLH, 
OHVVFRPSHWLWLYHLQGXVWULHVWHQGWRKDYHPRUH¿QDQFLDOUHVWDWHPHQWV7KHDXWKRUVIXUWKHUVKRZ 
that industries experiencing tariff reductions through exposure to greater foreign competition 
tend to have fewer restatements. Jiang et al. (2016) relate a deregulation-induced measure of 
competition to two bank opacity measures (abnormal accrual of loan loss provisions and the 
frequency of financial sWDWHPHQWUHVWDWHPHQWV7KH\¿QGWKDWLQWHQVL¿FDWLRQRIFRPSHWLWLRQ
following deregulation reduces abnormal accruals of loan loss provisions and the frequency 
ZLWKZKLFKEDQNVUHVWDWHWKHLU¿QDQFLDOVWDWHPHQWV7KH\FRQFOXGHWKDWFRPSHWLWLRQUHGXFHV
bank opacity by potentially enhancing the ability of markets to monitor banks.   
By contrast, another strand of the literature suggests that competition rather increases opacity 
by heightening managerial incentives to manipulate financial statements or to withhold quality 
information from outsiders. Shleifer (2004) argues that intense banking competition could 
lead to higher uncertainty due to the greater risk of unethical behaviour, including 
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aggressive earnings manipulations, among managers. Datta et al. (2011) contend that, 
unlike concentrated industries, where individual firms may have some pricing power, 
firms in competitive markets have limited pricing power and, thus, a reduced ability to 
maintain profit margins and absorb exogenous shocks to cost. Consequently, the 
increased competitive pressure increases the risk of financial statement manipulation, 
presumably to conceal poor or unfavourable financial results, which can consequently 
result in higher opacity in competitive markets. Further, greater competition may increase 
takeover threats (Jones et al., 2012; Jiang et al., 2016), causing job insecurity and, therefore, 
making managers more inclined to manipulate earnings (Armstrong et al., 2012). On 
information disclosure by competing firms, Verrecchia (1983) and Clinch and Verrecchia 
(1997) suggest that firms in industries characterised by intense product market 
competition tend to disclose less information because the disclosure of more (private) 
information gives competitors a strategic competitive advantage.  
Consistent with the theoretical predictions of the above-mentioned strand of literature, a 
few scholars (e.g., Bushman et al., 2016; Markarian and Santalo, 2014) report findings 
that suggest higher (lower) levels of opacity for firms in more competitive (concentrated) 
markets. For example, using the Lerner and Herfindahl-Hirschman (HHI) indexes to 
gauge the cross-industry variations in competition, Markarian and Santalo (2014) and 
Datta et al. ¿QGWKDWFRPSHWLWLRQLQFUHDVHVHDUQLQJVPDQDJHPHQW Bushman et al. 
(2016) use a textual analysiVRIEDQNV¶-.¿OLQJVWRPHDVXUH the competitive pressures 
IDFLQJEDQNVDQG¿QGWKDWEDQNVGHOD\WKHUHFRJQLWLRQRIH[SHFWHGORDQORVVHVZKHQWKH\
face stronger competition.  
The foregoing discussion points to an ambiguous relationship between competition and 
bank opacity. We, therefore, next turn to the innovation channel of the relationship to 
streamline our testable hypothesis. The innovation channel suggests that competition 
compels firms to be innovative, and thereby making it difficult to accurately assess the 
quality of their assets. In fact, as Hou and Robinson (2006) highlight, the very need for 
survival requires firms in competitive industries to innovate. Meanwhile, innovative firms 
are associated with greater technological discontinuities (i.e., sudden and dramatic 
changes in the use of a certain technology) and high information complexity, making it 
more difficult to assess their earnings. Datta et al. (2011) point out that the information 
complexity associated with innovative firms arises from the difficulty in quantifying 
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potential success of innovations as well as the deeply complex task of projecting counter 
responses of rival firms. Interestingly, empirical studies generally find a positive relation 
between innovative activities and product market competition (e.g., Nickell, 1996; Nerkar 
and Shane, 2003). For instance, Nerkar and Shane (2003) show that industry concentration 
inhibits the exploitation of new innovations because such innovations have no compelling 
strategic survival advantages. To the extent that innovation increases uncertainty about 
asset quality, this evidence implies that firms in concentrated and, possibly, less 
competitive markets are less opaque. 
Collectively, whilst the earnings management and information disclosure channels offer 
DPELJXRXVFRQFOXVLRQVRQWKHHIIHFWRIFRPSHWLWLRQRUPDUNHWSRZHURQILUPV¶RSDFLW\
the innovation channel seems to offer an unequivocal positive (negative) relationship 
between competition (market power) and ILUPV¶opacity. Therefore, the crucial role of 
financial innovations in the banking sector (e.g., Wagner, 2007; Dewally and Shao, 2013) 
suggests that competition in banking is more likely than not to increase bank opacity. 
This leads us to hypothesise that the extent of competition (market power) in the banking 
market should be positively (negatively) related to bank opacity.    
We test the above hypothesis in ways that differ from the above strands of literature, and thus 
allowing us to further extend our understanding of the competition-opacity nexus. First, whilst 
the existing literature focuses mainly on accounting measures of opacity, we measure 
RSDFLW\WKURXJKDQDO\VWV¶ forecast properties. As previously noted, accounting measures 
are unable to fully reflect the extent of bank opacity because they are: (i) historical in 
orientation; and (ii) subject to managerial manipulations (Burks et al., 2017; Dichev et al., 
2013). In contrast, DQDO\VWV¶IRUHFDVWSURSHUWLHV(errors and dispersions) offer a more direct 
and superior measure of opacity, as they reflect past, current and future opacity levels by 
drawing on both publicly and privately available information (Keskek et al., 2017; Ye and 
Yu, 2017).  
By their nature, analysts are important participants in capital markets. They are efficient 
intermediaries between banks and investors, processing public information efficiently to 
derive private information useful for market discipline. Further, they provide effective 
monitoring of banks (Mansi et al., 2011; Boubakri et al., 2015), regularly revising forecasts 
throughout the year as they update their private information. In fact, the empirical literature 
VXJJHVWV WKDW DQDO\VWV¶ IRUHFDVW SURSHUties have a first-order causality effect on market 
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liquidity (Roulstone, 2003; Boubakri et al. 2015). For instance, Roulstone (2003) finds that 
DQDO\VWV¶ IRUHFDVW GLVSHUVLRQ LQFUHDVHV WKH ELG-ask spread and its adverse selection 
component. Similarly, Mansi HWDODQG%RXEDNULHWDOVKRZWKDWDQDO\VWV¶
forecast inaccuracies and dispersions are significantly associated with higher credit 
VSUHDGV&ROOHFWLYHO\WKHVHVWXGLHVVXJJHVWWKDWDQDO\VWV¶IRUHFDVWSURSHUWLHV (errors and 
dispersions) may represent a superior measure of opacity with specific reference to broader 
market discipline. Consequently, our reliance on market-based analysts forecast properties 
to derive a superior proxy for opacity represents an important contribution to the literature, 
which may help to resolve the ambiguities in the market structure-bank opacity literature.  
Specifically, the errors in the earnings forecasts of analysts, as well as the disagreements 
among analysts (dispersion of forecasts) that follow a bank, may be strong indicators of 
opacity. Our approach and rationale in proxying bank opacity is akin to that adopted by 
Morgan (2002) and Fosu et al. (2017). While Morgan (2002) relies on the disagreements 
between specialist ERQGUDWLQJDJHQFLHV0RRG\¶VDQG6tandard & PRRU¶V) as a measure of 
opacity in banks and insurance companies, Fosu et al. (2017) utilise analyst forecast errors 
and disagreements among analysts in their forecasts RIEDQNV¶HDUQLQJVWRPHDVXUHEDQN
opacity.   
Second, we employ a direct measure of competition at the bank level, the Lerner index. Our 
measure is more intuitive and popular in the banking literature (see Beck et al., 2013; Anginer 
et al., 2014), as it is more capable of capturing competition arising from the interactions 
amongst existing banks and new entrants. Unlike other structural measures of competition, 
such as concentration indices and market share, the Lerner index does not require a precise 
geographic definition of banking markets (Aghion et al., 2005). This unique feature of the 
Lerner index is particularly important as banks become increasingly diversified and banking 
markets become increasingly deregulated, with geographic boundaries between them 
gradually becoming faint. Further, the Lerner index provides a measure of bank pricing power 
on both assets and funding cost and reflects the banks¶ franchise value (Beck et al., 2013; 
Anginer et al., 2014) upon which the theoretical argument for the competition-opacity 
relationship partly depends (e.g., Verrecchia, 1983). Thus, the Lerner index which we 
employ in our study has a sound economic basis and an intuitive appeal to capture salient 
features of competition different from those used in other existing studies.  
In summary, the academic debate on the relationship between competition and opacity in 
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the banking literature remains largely inconclusive, necessitating further research. We 
contribute to resolving this puzzle by proposing analyst forecast properties as an 
alternative measure of opacity in banking in conjunction with an intuitively appealing non-
structural measure of competition (i.e., the Lerner index).  
 
3. Data and empirical methodology 
3.1 Data description 
We obtain consolidated balance sheet and income statement from FR Y-9C quarterly reports 
filed with the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. In addition to this dataset, we obtain the market 
data for bank holding companies from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) 
database. )XUWKHU ZH REWDLQ DQDO\VWV¶ IRUHFDVW DQG DFWXDO HDUQLQJV SHU VKDUH GDWD IURP WKH
Detail HLVWRU\ ILOH RI WKH ,QVWLWXWLRQDO %URNHUV¶ (VWLPDWH 6\VWHP ,%(6 :H link the 
consolidated balance sheet and income statement with the market data using the CRSP-FRB 
link table from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. We then link the resulting dataset with 
the anal\VWV¶HDUQLQJVIRUHFDVWGDWD. For consistency, we follow Jones et al. (2012) and present 
all balance sheet items as end of quarter amounts, whilst income statement variables are 
annualised quarterly amounts. 
Following the existing literature (e.g., Fosu, 2014; Haw et al., 2015), we apply a few exclusion 
criteria. These include banks with missing values for the main variables. We also exclude banks 
with negative stock price. Finally, bank holding companies with fewer than three consecutive 
quarters of data are also excluded. We finally ended up with an unbalanced panel of 610 bank 
holding companies over the 1986-2015 period. 
3.2 Estimation method 
In this section, we model the empirical relationship between bank opacity and competition. We 
follow the existing literature (e.g., Datta et al., 2011; Haw et al., 2015; Jiang et al., 2016) and 
control for a number of bank-OHYHO IDFWRUV DQG DQDO\VWV¶ FKDUDFWHULVWLFV Specifically, we 
employ the following econometric framework: 
                    
, , 1 , , 1 , 1
1
K
i t i t k k i t i t
k
Opacity Competition XD E J H  
 
   ¦                            (1) 
where Opacity, Competition and X are proxies for bank opacity, banking market competition 
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and other control variables, respectively, all of which are as defined in Section 3.3; D , E  and
J
 are parameters; the subscript i and t  indicate the thi bank and the tht time period; and k
indices the thk control variable. H  is a composite error term made up of bank-specific fixed-
effects ( iP ) and an independent and identically distributed component ( ti,X ). 
As indicated in Section 1, we take the view that banks behave differently during crisis periods 
than in normal times, as crisis can heighten industry-wide distress, availability of information 
and incentives to monitor banks (Flannery et al., 2013; Simkovic, 2013). To take account of 
this difference in bank behaviour over time, we extend Equation (1) to include a crisis dummy 
variable, taking the value of 1 for the period 2007-2009, representing the recent financial crisis, 
and 0 otherwise. We thus obtain Eq. (2) as follows: 
       , , 1 , , 1 , 1 , 1
1
K
i t i t k k i t i t t i t
k
Opacity Competition X Competition CrisisD E J K I H   
 
     ¦   (2) 
where Crisis is a dummy variable representing the 2007-2009 financial crisis; and K  and M  
are parameters. We also compare the potential impact of the pre-crisis period on bank opacity 
by replacing the crisis dummy in Eq. (2) with a pre-crisis dummy taking the value of 1 for the 
years prior to the 2007-09 crisis, and 0 otherwise. 
Eqs. (1) and (2) can be estimated using OLS; however, this approach could lead to biased and 
inconsistent estimates due to the correlation of the firm fixed-effects with the explanatory 
variables (Wooldridge, 2009, p. 465). Hence, we estimate these models using the panel fixed-
effects approach and use pooled OLS only for robustness check. We control for time fixed-
effects by including time dummies in all estimations. Finally, we adjust the standard error using 
the Huber-White approach and clustering at the firm level. 
3.3 Measurements of variables 
3.3.1. Competition 
The banking literature typically measures competition using the Lerner index, Panzar-Ross 
H-statistics, Boone indicator and structural measures, such as the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index (HHI). Amongst these measures, however, the Lerner index is the only measure of 
competition that varies at the bank level, whilst the remaining measures are best suited for 
measuring cross-country differences in competition. This perhaps explains why the Lerner 
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index is a popular measure of competition in the banking literature. For instance, Beck et al. 
(2013) employ the index to investigate whether competition affects bank stability, whereas 
Anginer et al. (2014) rely on it to explore the link between competition and bank systemic 
risks. 
Since we DUHSDUWLFXODUO\ LQWHUHVWHG LQ LQGLYLGXDOEDQNV¶FKDQJHs in opacity in response to 
variations in competition, we follow past studies (Beck et al., 2013; Anginer et al., 2014; Datta 
et al., 2011; Haw et al., 2015) to infer the extent of banking market competition from the 
Lerner index ± a firm-level measure of competitiveness or market/pricing power. We rely on 
the classical economic theory that firms in a perfectly competitive market will be price takers 
and not have much control of prices and profitability (e.g., Mankiw and Whinston, 1986). By 
contrast, in less competitive markets, individual firms may exercise some control over 
pricing/profitability, and thus enjoy some level of market power and competitive advantage.  
The Lerner index measures the degree of market power exercised by banks, which is proxied 
by the extent to which banks can charge a higher price above marginal cost. Thus, higher values 
of the index indicate greater market power, and by extension lower levels of competition in a 
market, and vice versa. In sum, the Lerner index is a direct measure of banking market power, 
and, arguably, an indirect measure of banking market competition.3 The Lerner index is 
computed as follows: 
ti
titi
ti P
MCP
Lerner
,
,,
,
                      (3) 
where Pit, refers to price of total assets of bank i at time t, proxied by the ratio of total revenue 
to total assets; and MCi,t refers to the marginal cost of bank i at time t. We cannot directly 
observe marginal cost; hence, we follow the extant literature (e.g., Fernández et al., 2013; Beck 
et al., 2013) and derive it from a translog cost function (TCF) as in Eq. (6) below: 
                                                     
3We also construct a market-level Lerner index to replace our firm-level index in new sets of regressions reported 
later, in Section 4.4 (see Table 11). Our conclusions remain robust to this market-level proxy for competition. 
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where ܥ௜ǡ௧ refers to the total cost of bank i at time t; ܳ௜௧ refers to output, proxied by total assets 
of bank i at time t; and ௞ܹǡ௜௧ is input prices of labour (k=1), capital (k=2) and funding (k=3) for 
bank i at time t. We apply symmetry and homogeneity of degree one in input prices by scaling 
the total cost (C) and the price of inputs by the input price of funds. The marginal costs are 
obtained from Eq. (7) as indicated below: 
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3.3.2 Opacity  
As noted earlier, prior literature on the competition-opacity nexus in banking employs mainly 
accounting measures of bank opacity (e.g., Bushman et al., 2016; Jiang et al., 2017). However, 
these measures are limited because they are backward looking and fail to incorporate market 
perspective; and, as a result, they make it difficult to gauge the extent of market discipline 
(Burks et al., 2017; Dichev et al., 2013). Hence, following Flannery (2004), Ergungor et al. 
(2015) and Fosu et al. (2017), we derive our measures of opacity mainly from analystV¶ forecast 
properties, namely, analyst forecast error, analyst forecast dispersion and opacity score. Our 
approach broadly relies on the intuition in Morgan (2002) and Fosu et al. (2017) which 
suggests that disagreements among expert analysts and rating agencies may capture the 
extent of bank opacity. Before we proceed to derive these measures, we ensure that only 
the most recent earnings forecast for every analyst who provides more than one forecast is 
used. Additionally, we adjust earnings forecast using the CRSP cumulative adjustment 
factor to ensure that actual and forecast earnings per share are based on the same number 
of shares outstanding (Robinson and Glushkov, 2006).  
:HPHDVXUHDQDO\VWV¶IRUHFDVWHUURUDVWKHDEVROXWHYDOXHRIWKHGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQPHDQ
DQDO\VWV¶IRUHFDVWVDQGDFWXDOHDUQLQJVSHUVKDUHVFDOHGE\WKHVKDUHSULFHDWWKHbeginning 
of the fiscal quarter6SHFL¿FDOO\ZHFRPSXWHDQDO\VWV¶IRUHFDVWHUURUDVEHORZ 
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where ܨܧܲ ௜ܵ௧ is the average of all earnings forecasts for bank i LQ¿VFDOquarter t; ܣܧܲ ௜ܵ௧ is 
the actual earnings per share for bank i LQ¿VFDOquarter t; and Pricei,t-1 is the share price of bank 
i at the beginning RI¿VFDOquarter t.  
Our second measure of opacity, the dispersion of analyst earnings forecasts, is measured as the 
VWDQGDUGGHYLDWLRQRIDQDO\VWV¶IRUHFDVWVIRUWKH¿VFDOquarter scaled by the share price at the 
beginning of the ¿VFDOTXDUWHU. We construct our third measure of opacity, opacity score, such 
that we exploit the informativeness of both forecast error and forecast dispersion. Specifically, 
we first follow Clement and Tse (2005) and Kim et al. (2011) by applying a transformation 
that preserves the relative distance of both forecast errors and forecast dispersion as follows: 
, ,
,
, ,
(  ) (  )
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Norm rror
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The transformed variables range from 0 to 1. We then develop Opacity Score as the sum of the 
transformed forecast error ( _ E )Norm rror  and the transformed forecast dispersion 
( _ )Norm Dispersion : 
DispersionNormrrorNormScoreOpacity _E__                                           (9) 
3.3.3 Control variables 
To gauge the relationship between competition and opacity, we follow the existing literature 
(e.g., Li, 2010; Datta et al., 2011; Haw et al., 2015; Huyghebaert and Xu, 2016) and control for 
several variables in our econometric models. We include bank size (Size, the natural logarithm 
RIHDFKEDQN¶V WRWDODVVHWV WRDFFRXQW IRU WKHSRVVLELOLW\ WKDW ODUJHEDQNVKDYHPRUHVWDEOH
earnings and do disclose more information (Huyghebaert and Xu, 2016). Larger banks may 
also be followed by a larger number of analysts, which subsequently impacts forecast accuracy 
17 
 
(Ye and Yu, 2017). Hence, we also account for the number of analysts (Analyst) following each 
bank in each quarter.  
We acknowledge that each of these analysts may have differing levels of general forecast 
experience (Experience) and firm-specific experience (Length), measured as the average 
number of days since the analysts first forecast for any firm or for the covered firm, respectively 
(Clement, 1999; Ergungor et al., 2015). Further, each following analyst may have a different 
breadth of coverage, which may influence their forecast accuracy; hence, we include the 
number of firms followed by each covered analyst in each quarter, Scope (Ergungor et al., 
2015). The marginal benefits of DQDO\VW¶V experience and breadth of coverage may diminish 
over time; hence, we express these variables as 1 plus their natural logarithm.  
Moreover, we account for bank business model by including variables capturing funding and 
income structure. Bank funding structure is the proportion of core deposits to total liabilities 
(Deposits), whilst income structure is the proportion of non-interest income to total income 
(Non-interest). Banks with core deposits have stable funding (Huang and Ratnovski, 2011), but 
they are subject to less stringent monitoring (Calomiris, 1999). Banks with higher non-interest 
income could be complex, making their earnings difficult to forecast (Thomas, 2002). 
Additionally, we control for bank capital (Capital), the ratio of book value of equity to total 
assets, as DEDQN¶Vlevel of capitalisation is associated with its level of stability or risk-taking, 
with consequences for its level of opacity. Also, more volatile earnings make bank assets 
difficult to value; hence, we control for earnings volatility (Volatility) as in Datta et al. (2011) 
and Haw et al. (2015). We measure Volatility as the annual standard deviation of return on 
equity. Likewise, we control for earnings surprise (Surprise)GH¿QHGDVWKHDEVROXWHGLIIHUHQFH
between current and prior quarter earnings per share (Haw et al., 2015). Finally, we include the 
ratio of bank loans to total assets (Loans) and loan loss provisions to total assets (Provisions) 
WRFDSWXUHEDQNV¶OHQGLQJ specialisation and credit risk, respectively. Table 1 presents a detailed 
list and definitions of all variables used. 
 [Table 1 about here] 
3.4. Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations 
In Table 2, we present the descriptive statistics of the variables for our empirical analysis. We 
report our three measures of opacity: (i) analyst forecast error, (ii) analyst forecast dispersion 
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and (iii) opacity score. The mean values of these measures are 0.44, 0.20 and 0.26, respectively. 
These variables also have a standard deviation of 0.90, 0.37 and 0.36, respectively. This implies 
that, among these three measures, analyst forecast error has the highest mean value and degree 
of variability. In general, our measures of opacity exhibit high levels of variability. Further, the 
mean value of our competition variable (Lerner) is 0.64 with a standard deviation of 0.16. This 
variable rises from a minimum of 0.35 to a maximum of 0.87, suggesting a high degree of 
heterogeneity across the banks investigated.   
With respect to the control variables, a few findings are worth noting. First, we observe that 
the mean value of Size is 15.55 with a standard deviation of 1.47. This variable has a minimum 
and maximum value of 13.45 and 18.70, respectively, signifying a fair degree of heterogeneity. 
Also, the average value of the number of analysts following is 6.33, with a standard deviation 
of 6.22. It also has a minimum value of 1 and a maximum value of 39, suggesting high levels 
of heterogeneity in the number of analysts following the sample banks. The mean value of 
general experience (Experience) is 7.60 with a standard deviation of 0.87, a minimum value of 
0 and a maximum value of 9.22, thus exhibiting a high level of heterogeneity. We also note 
that Length and Scope have mean values of 6.28 and 2.77, respectively. These variables have 
standard deviations of 1.54 and 0.34 and minimum (maximum) values of 0.00 (8.71) and 0.69 
(4.93), respectively. These figures show a moderate degree of variability and a high degree of 
heterogeneity in the characteristics of analysts following the banks investigated.  
[Table 2 about here] 
Turning our attention to Table 3, we present the correlation between the variables used in our 
study. We first note that the correlations between our measures of opacity (i.e., analyst forecast 
error, analyst forecast dispersion and opacity score) are very high. This suggests that all the 
three dependent variables are capturing similar information (i.e., opacity). A preliminary 
insight into the relationship between opacity and competition (Lerner) is also illustrated by the 
correlation matrix. We observe that the correlation (but not necessarily causal relationship) 
between our measures of opacity (i.e., analyst forecast error, analyst forecast dispersion and 
opacity score) and Lerner is negative.  
In general, the evidence emerging from the correlation matrix, as well as the descriptive 
statistics, suggests that our sample does not seem to suffer from serious issues such as limited 
variation and heterogeneity or large outliers. 
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 [Table 3 about here] 
4. Results and Discussion 
In this study, we set out to investigate the banking competition-opacity relationship by using 
three different but related measures of opacity. We observe a slight variation in the sample size 
depending on the choice of dependent variables; that is, (i) analyst forecast error, (ii) analyst 
forecast dispersion or (iii) opacity score. In the sections that follow, we look at the impact of 
banking competition on each of these measures of opacity.  
4.1 Banking competition and bank opacity ± analysts' forecast error 
In Table 4, we present the empirical results of Eq. (1) by testing the effect of competition on 
bank opacity derived from analysts' forecast error. Models 1 to 5 are based on OLS estimation 
and 6 to 10 present panel fixed-effects estimation.  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
We start our discussion with Models 1 and 6 where bank opacity is explained by competition 
(Lerner index) only. In both models, the coefficient on Lerner index is negative and statistically 
significant at the 1% level, suggesting that greater banking market power reduces bank opacity. 
This implies that intense competition in banking markets may increase bank opacity. We 
extend Models 1 and 6 by including control variables for bank size, lending specialisation, the 
level of capitalisation, earnings surprise, loan loss provisions, volatility of returns on equity 
and analysts following in Models 2 and 7. We further control for bank business model, proxied 
by the ratio of non-interest income to total income and the ratio of core deposits to total deposits 
alternatively in Models 3-4 and Models 8-9, and jointly in Models 5 and 10. The coefficient on 
Lerner index remains negative and statistically significant at the 1% level throughout all 
specifications, supporting the negative (positive) relationship between market power 
(competition) and opacity. The economic impact of banking market power is also very large. 
Based on our fully specified models, a one standard deviation increase in the Lerner index is 
associated with a 14.81±17.23 basis SRLQWGHFUHDVHLQDQDO\VWV¶IRUHFDVWHUURURXUPHDVXUHRI
opacity. This represents 33.55%±39.05% of the mean bank opacity. Overall, our finding 
suggests that, in a competitive banking environment, banks are less likely to disclose sensitive 
information, to prevent rivals from capitalising on the information (Verrecchia, 1983).  
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Although our finding is in stark contrast to Jiang et al. (2016), we exercise a fair amount of 
caution in our comparison, as our measures of opacity and competition differ from theirs. Our 
results, however, support the evidence in Bushman, Hendricks and Williams (2016) showing 
that greater competition is associated with higher opacity, as measured by less timely loan loss 
recognitions. Our finding suggests that the recent Basel III regulatory framework, which 
promotes market discipline through bank transparency, could yield more benefits in countries 
with a relatively higher degree of banking market competition.  
With respect to the control variables, notable observations are that larger firms have larger 
DQDO\VWV¶IRUHFDVWHUURUV7KLVILQGLQJVXJJHVWs that larger banks are more opaque than their 
smaller counterpart banks, and it is consistent with the evidence that larger banks exercise more 
discretion on loan loss provisions (Jiang et al., 2016) and on asset valuation (Huizinga and 
Laeven, 2012). This finding is also consistent with the evidence for non-financial firms, 
suggesting that larger ILUPVKDYHODUJHUDQDO\VWV¶IRUHFDVWerrors (Datta et al., 2011; Haw et al., 
2015). Also, banks with large outstanding loans, and hence higher lending specialisation, have 
higher forecast errors. Similarly, banks with a larger share of loan loss provisions, signifying 
exposure to credit risk, exhibit larger forecast errors. Moreover, in line with Anolli et al. (2014), 
Datta et al. (2011) and Haw et al. (2015), we find that volatility of return on equity increases 
forecast errors. Banks with higher earnings surprise have larger forecast errors, whilst banks 
followed by a larger number of analysts have lower analysts¶ forecast errors. These findings 
are also largely consistent with the evidence for non-financial firms (e.g., Datta et al., 2011; 
Haw et al., 2015). Further, non-interest income capturing earnings diversification is positively 
associated with forecast errors. This finding is consistent with the view that income 
diversification makes earnings less predictable (Thomas, 2002). Finally, dependence on core 
deposit funding is positively assRFLDWHGZLWKDQDO\VWV¶IRUHFDVWHUURUV7KLVILQGLQJLVFRQVLVWHQW
with the view that deposit funding is associated with less monitoring (Calomiris, 1999). In 
contrast, banks with higher levels of capital have lower forecast error. 
4.2 Banking competition and bank opacity ± other related measures of opacity 
In this section, we demonstrate that our results are robust to using other analyst forecast-related 
measures of opacity. First, we follow Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) and Fosu et al. 
(2016) and employ analysts¶ forecast dispersion as our measure of opacity. Forecast dispersion 
captures the disagreement amongst analysts that follow a bank (Krishnaswami and 
Subramaniam, 1999); hence, it represents a good measure of opacity. We present the results in 
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Table 5. As before, we follow the sequential approach where we first model forecast dispersion 
as a function of competition (Models 1 and 5) only and extend the model to include bank-
specific control variables (Models 2 and 6) as well as the bank business model variables 
(Models 3-5 and 8-10). The results show that the coefficient on Lerner index is negative and 
statistically significant at the 1% level. The impact of Lerner index on DQDO\VWV¶ IRUHFDVW
dispersion is also economically significant ± a one standard deviation increase in the Lerner 
index is associated with a 29.97%±32.08% decrease in the mean forecast dispersion of the 
average bank. This finding suggests that banking market power (competition) significantly 
decreases (increases) bank opacity, which is in line with our earlier results. 
The coefficients on the control variables are also consistently signed. Larger banks have higher 
forecast dispersion, as they are banks with higher levels of lending specialisation, earnings 
surprise, loan loss provisions, volatility of returns and non-interest income. In contrast, and 
consistent with the previous results, banks with higher levels of capital have lower forecast 
dispersion. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
Second, we develop a measure of opacity that is based on the normalised values of DQDO\VWV¶
IRUHFDVWHUURUVDQGIRUHFDVWGLVSHUVLRQ6SHFLILFDOO\ZHQRUPDOLVHERWKDQDO\VWV¶IRUHFDVWHUURUV
and forecast dispersion so that each of them ranges between 0 and 1. We then sum up the 
normalised values of these variables and derive our third measure of opacity, Opacity Score. 
In Table 6, we present the estimation results based on this measure of opacity. We note that the 
coefficient on Opacity Score is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level across all 
models, suggesting that banking market power (competition) increases bank opacity. The 
impact of market power (competition) is also noteworthy ± a one standard deviation increase 
in competition is associated with a 29.97%±35.34% decrease (increase) in bank opacity. On 
the control variables, we find that bank size, lending specialisation, earnings surprise, 
provisions for loan losses, volatility of returns on equity and non-interest income increase bank 
opacity, whilst higher levels of bank capital decrease bank opacity.  
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
Overall, the results obtained from using alternative measures of bank opacity suggest that 
intense banking competition increases bank opacity; the effect is both statistically significant 
and economically significant. 
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4.3 Banking competition and bank opacity ± addressing potential endogeneity 
We acknowledge the concern that bank opacity and the levels of banking competition may be 
simultaneously determined, leading to potential endogeneity issues, which can bias our 
findings. This issue is of less concern since we lag our independent variables. In this section, 
however, we take extra steps to address the potential endogeneity issues and show that our 
findings remain robust. 
We re-estimate our main models using a two-stage estimation approach. We employ bank 
inefficiency, measured as the ratio of bank overheads to income (i.e., cost-income ratio), and 
the second lag of the Lerner index as instruments for the Lerner index. Hence, in the first stage, 
we model the Lerner index, as a function of its second lag, of cost-income ratio, and all the 
other exogenous variables. In the second stage, we model our measures of bank opacity 
(forecast error, forecast dispersion and opacity scores) alternately, as a function of the predicted 
values of the Lerner index, derived from the first-stage regressions, and all the other control 
variables. We present the results in Table 7. 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
In Models 1, 3 and 5 of Table 6, we present the results of the first-stage regression. The 
coefficient on cost-income ratio and the lagged Lerner index are positive and significant at the 
1% level across all the models. This suggests that the instruments are relevant. The diagnostic 
tests presented also confirm the relevance and validity of the instruments.4 In Models 2, 4 and 
6, we present the second-stage regression results. The coefficient on the Lerner index remains 
negative and significant across these models. The results corroborate our earlier finding 
suggesting that a higher degree of market power (intense banking competition) decreases 
(increases) bank opacity. Overall, the results suggest that the findings are not plagued by 
endogeneity problems. 
4.4. Other robustness checks and further analysis 
In this section, we present the results of a battery of robustness tests by: (i) controlling for 
analyst characteristics; (ii) disentangling the effect of crisis; (iii) using state-quarter mean-
                                                     
4The Hansen J-statistics p-values are all in excess of 0.1. This suggests that the over-identifying restrictions are 
valid (e.g., Baum, Schaffer and Stillman, 2003). Also, the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic, compared with 
the Stock-Yogo IV critical values, rules out weak instrument problems; they are all larger than the rule-of-thumb 
minimum of 10 (Baum, 2006). 
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adjusted measure of competition; and (iv) utilising a market-level competition measure. We 
present the results in Tables 8-11. In all cases, we confirm our results suggesting that banking 
market power (competition) decreases (increases) bank opacity. 
First, the analyst forecast literature suggests that analysts¶ H[SHULHQFHJDLQHGE\FRYHULQJ a 
particular bank (firm-specific experience) or several banks (general experience) over time 
impacts their forecast ability (e.g., Clement, 1999; Mikhail, Walther, and Willis, 1997; 
Ergungor et al., 2015). To this end, we re-estimate our models again by coQWUROOLQJIRUDQDO\VWV¶
firm-specific experience, general level of experience and scope of coverage, alternately and 
jointly. We present the results in Table 8. The coefficient on the Lerner index remains negative 
and statistically significant at the 1% level across all models in Table 8, confirming our main 
finding that banking market power (competition) decreases (increases) bank opacity. The 
importance of analysts¶ H[SHULHQFH LV, however, mixed: DQDO\VWV¶ general experience is 
negatively and significantly related to all of our opacity measures, but the scope of DQDO\VWV¶ 
coverage seems to reduce forecast error only ZKHQZHGRQRWFRQWUROIRUDQDO\VWV¶EDQN-specific 
and general level of experience. Contrary to our expectations, we find that the bank-specific 
experience seems to increase opacity derived from forecast error and opacity score.  
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
Second, we address the concern that our finding may be plagued by the confounding effect of 
the recent financial crisis. Our sample period covers the 2007-09 financial crisis. The crisis 
could affect analysts¶ RSWLPLVP DQG SHVVLPLVP, as it increases industry-wide distress 
(Easterwood and Nutt, 1999; Flannery et al., 2013). Moreover, the crisis could affect EDQNV¶
incentives to release accurate information about themselves (Flannery et al., 2013), as well as 
the incentives of key stakeholders in competitive markets to monitor banks (Simkovic, 2013). 
Thus, the impact of competition on bank opacity may vary across normal and crisis periods. 
To examine this issue, we include dummy variables for the pre-crisis (1986-2006) and acute 
crisis (2007-2009) periods in our regression. The post-crisis period (2010-2015) effectively 
becomes the reference period. This approach permits us to observe whether the crisis sub-
periods shift the regression line. Further, we include the interaction terms between these 
dummy variables and the Lerner index, thus permitting us to assess the moderating role of the 
crisis on the opacity-competition nexus.  
In Models 1-3 of Table 9, we present the results where forecast error is our measure of opacity. 
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The coefficient on the Lerner index remains negative and significant. The coefficient on the 
interaction term between the Lerner index and pre-crisis dummy variable is, however, positive 
across all models, suggesting that competition decreases bank opacity, albeit by a lower margin 
in the period prior to financial crisis. However, the coefficient on the interaction term between 
the Lerner index and the crisis dummy variables is negative and statistically significant, 
suggesting that competition increases bank opacity by a larger margin during a crisis period. 
We obtain qualitatively similar results in Models 4-6 and Models 7-9 where forecast dispersion 
and opacity score are used, respectively, as the measure of opacity. These results are generally 
in line with the view that banks become more opaque during a crisis period than in normal 
periods (e.g., Flannery et al., 2013). 
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
Third, we address the concern that the bank-level competition measure that we use may be 
driven by state-specific attributes, such as regulatory and institutional differences, that may 
bias the opacity-competition nexus. We address this concern in two main ways. Firstly, we 
adjust our competition measure by subtracting from the bank-level measure of competition the 
state-mean competition, thereby arriving at a state-quarter mean-adjusted measure of 
competition. Similarly, we adjust our measures of opacity and obtain state-quarter mean-
adjusted opacity. We then re-estimate our models using these state-quarter mean-adjusted 
measures of competition and opacity. This approach effectively controls for state-quarter fixed 
effects, which helps to identify systematic differences in competition and opacity (see Clement, 
1999). We report our findings in Table 10. The results support our main finding that market 
power (competition) decreases (increases) bank opacity.  
[Insert Table 10 about here] 
Finally, we acknowledge the concern that the Lerner index, which measures bank market 
power, may not capture competition at the banking market level. To address this concern, we 
obtain an aggregate banking market-level measure of competition by taking the average of the 
Lerner index across banks for each state-quarter (e.g., Hainz et al., 2013; Calderon and 
Schaeck, 2016). We report the findings in Table 11. The coefficient on the mean Lerner index 
remains negative and statistically significant across all models. Overall, the results are 
consistent with our main finding that competition increases bank opacity.  
 [Insert Table 11 about here] 
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5. Conclusion 
Bank opacity remains a key element in regulatory framework, especially in the wave of 
banking system deregulation. In particular, the 2007-09 financial crisis has partly been 
attributed to poor practices relating to lack of disclosure, transparency and fair competition 
within the global banking system. This has resulted in a considerable amount of reforms 
relating to disclosure, transparency and competition in the banking sector. In this case, the 
comprehensive Basel III accord is at the apex of such efforts. For example, Basel III 
requires enhanced disclosures with respect to the details of the components of regulatory 
capital and their reconciliation to the reported accounts, including transparency on how 
banks calculate their regulatory capital ratios. Such comprehensive banking reforms have 
also appealed to a renewed empirical interest in the nexus between bank opacity and 
several banking market outcomes, such as risk-taking and performance, with little 
attention paid to banking competition. In fact, the existing empirical literature focuses mainly 
on analysing deregulatory and textual-analysis measures of competition on accounting 
measures of opacity.  
We, therefore, have departed from much of the existing literature by utilising the traditional 
competition measure (the Lerner index) and a market-based measure of opacity to provide 
robust first-hand evidence that banking market competitioQLQFUHDVHVDQDO\VWV¶forecast error, 
dispersion and score. Our findings, thus, show that banking market competition (market power) 
increases (decreases) bank opacity. This finding is consistent with Bushman et al. (2016) who 
show that greater competition is associated with higher bank risks and less timely loan loss 
recognitions. However, our finding is at odds with that of Jiang et al. (2016) who find increased 
levels of competition through deregulation to be associated with quality bank reporting (i.e., 
low bank opacity). Further, we show that the effect of banking market competition on opacity 
persists over time but is more pronounced during crisis. This finding is novel in the 
competition-opacity literature. All our results are robust to controlling for traditional 
analyst characteristics, such as experience and scope, and to alternative estimation 
approaches. 
The findings from this study do not only deepen our understanding of the relationships between 
competition and opacity, but they also provide salient policy implications for the Basel III 
policy initiatives emphasising the need for transparency and market discipline. For instance, as 
market discipline (emphasised in Basel III) encompasses the ability of financial markets and 
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regulators to penalise banks for excessive risk-taking, transparency across the full operations 
RIEDQNVLVHVVHQWLDO7KLVGULYHVKRPH%DVHO,,,¶VFDOOIRUuniform and full disclosure of capital 
base and liquidity ratios, especially for countries with more competitive banking markets. In 
other words, the clarity offered by Basel III for the definitions of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital, as 
well as the total exposure of banks used in computing leverage ratios, could reduce room for 
abuse, enhance transparency and consequently reduce opacity that often plagues banks in 
competitive markets. For the Basel III disclosure and transparency accord to be effective, 
however, the development, implementation and enforcement of a uniform standard of reporting 
and disclosure framework akin to the international financial reporting standards framework by 
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision will be crucial. 
Notwithstanding the importance and robustness of our findings, it is useful to acknowledge the 
limitations of our paper. For example, similar to all archival-based studies of this nature, our 
proxies for opacity, competition and bank attributes may or may not reflect practice. In this 
case, future research may be able to offer further insights by conducting in-depth interviews 
with analysts, bankers, policymakers and regulators. Similarly, our study focuses on US banks; 
future studies may be able to enrich our findings by extending our analysis using a sample of 
banks from a number of countries, comprising both developed and developing countries. Also, 
as more data becomes available, future studies can extend our analysis by using greater post-
2007-09 financial crisis period datasets.  
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Table 1: Description of variables 
  
Variable Description 
 
Dependent variables  
Forecast error Measure of opacity, measured as the absolute value of the difference between 
PHDQDQDO\VWV¶IRUHFDVWVDQGDFWXDOHDUQLQJVSHUVKDUHVFDOHGE\WKHVKDUHSULFHDW
the beginning of the fiscal quarter. 
 
Forecast dispersion $OWHUQDWLYHPHDVXUHRIRSDFLW\PHDVXUHGDVWKHVWDQGDUGGHYLDWLRQRIDQDO\VWV¶
IRUHFDVWVIRUWKH¿VFDOquarter scaled by the share price at the beginning of the 
fiscal quarter. 
 
Opacity score Opacity index measured as the sum of the normalised values of DQDO\VWV¶IRUHFDVW
errors and forecast. 
 
Independent variables  
Lerner Lerner index, a measure of competition at the bank level derived from Eq. 3. A 
higher value of the index indicates lower competition. 
 
Size Bank size, measured as the natural logarithm of total assets. 
 
Loans The ratio of bank loans to total assets.  
 
Capital The ratio of book value of equity to total assets.  
 
Surprise (DUQLQJVVXUSULVHGH¿QHGDVWKHDEVROXWHYDOXHRIWKHGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQFXUUHQW
earnings per share and the prior quarter HDUQLQJVSHUVKDUHGHÀDWHGE\VWRFNSULFH
at the beginning of the fiscal quarter. 
 
Provisions The ratio of loan loss provisions to total loans. 
 
Volatility Standard deviation of return on equity. 
 
Analysts The number of analysts following. 
 
Non-interest The ratio of non-interest income to total income. 
  
Deposits The ratio of core deposits to total liabilities. 
 
Experience General experience: the log of one plus the total days since the analyst first issued 
a forecast for any bank they are following. 
 
Length Firm-specific experience: the log of one plus average number of days since the 
analysts covering a bank first issued a forecast for the bank.  
 
Scope Scope of coverage: the log of one plus the average number of banks covered by 
the analysts following a bank in the fiscal quarter. 
The table presents the mnemonics and description of each dependent and independent variable used in this paper. 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
      
 Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Obs. 
Absolute forecast error 0.44 0.90 0.00 3.75 18632.00 
Forecast dispersion 0.20 0.38 0.00 1.57 15255.00 
Opacity score 0.26 0.46 0.00 2.00 15255.00 
Lerner 0.64 0.16 0.35 0.87 18632.00 
Size 15.55 1.47 13.45 18.70 18632.00 
Loans 0.87 0.15 0.56 1.16 18631.00 
Capital 0.09 0.02 0.06 0.14 18632.00 
Surprise 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.08 17502.00 
Provisions 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.03 18631.00 
Volatility 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.12 18338.00 
Analysts 6.33 6.22 1.00 39.00 18632.00 
Non-interest 0.80 0.10 0.54 0.94 18632.00 
Deposits 0.67 0.14 0.32 0.87 18065.00 
Experience 7.60 0.87 0.00 9.22 18632.00 
Length 6.28 1.54 0.00 8.71 18632.00 
Scope 2.77 0.34 0.69 4.93 18632.00 
The table presents the descriptive statistics for all variables used in this study. The sample comprises 610 US bank holding companies over 
the period 1986-2015. All variables are as defined in Table 1. 
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Table 3: Correlations matrix 
                 
 Error Dispersion score Lerner Size Loans Capital Surprise Provisions Volatility Analysts Non-
interes
t 
Deposits Experience Length Scope 
Forecast error 1.00                
Forecast 
dispersion 
0.77* 1.00               
Opacity score 0.93* 0.93* 1.00              
Lerner -0.04* -0.04* -0.03* 1.00             
Size -0.06* -0.01 -0.02* 0.09* 1.00            
Loans 0.09* 0.12* 0.10* 0.01 0.08* 1.00           
Capital -0.07* -0.04* -0.07* 0.13* -0.09* 0.08* 1.00          
Surprise 0.66* 0.72* 0.72* -0.05* -0.03* 0.09* -0.07* 1.00         
Provisions 0.28* 0.31* 0.33* 0.02 0.22* -0.17* -0.10* 0.32* 1.00        
Volatility 0.52* 0.51* 0.54* -0.02 0.06* 0.10* -0.14* 0.55* 0.25* 1.00       
Analysts -0.06* 0.01 -0.02 0.11* 0.81* 0.11* 0.09* -0.03* 0.17* 0.03* 1.00      
Non-interest 0.10* 0.07* 0.09* -0.12* -0.48* 0.11* -0.13* 0.07* -0.05* 0.01 -0.49* 1.00     
Deposits -0.07* -0.09* -0.08* 0.03* -0.38* -0.30* 0.21* -0.08* -0.02* -0.15* -0.29* 0.25* 1.00    
Experience 0.01 0.05* 0.04* 0.08* 0.23* 0.07* 0.19* 0.03* 0.02 0.02 0.30* -0.22* -0.06* 1.00   
Length 0.03* 0.07* 0.05* 0.08* 0.38* 0.03* 0.08* 0.04* 0.12* 0.04* 0.39* -0.26* -0.10* 0.53* 1.00  
Scope -0.04* -0.04* -0.02* -0.01 0.08* -0.02 -0.02* -0.04* 0.06* -0.04* 0.06* -0.01 0.07* 0.25* 0.18* 1.00 
The table presents the unconditional correlation coefficient between any pair of variables. All variables are as described in Table 1. * indicates significance at 5%. 
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Table 4: Banking competition and bank opacity ± analysts' forecast error 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS FE FE FE FE FE 
Lerner -2.181*** -1.102*** -1.090*** -1.091*** -1.051*** -1.592*** -1.021*** -0.863*** -1.068*** -0.904*** 
 (0.492) (0.264) (0.258) (0.274) (0.266) (0.343) (0.253) (0.238) (0.254) (0.236) 
Size  -0.005 0.007 -0.004 0.005  0.078*** 0.053* 0.088*** 0.062** 
  (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015)  (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028) 
Loans  0.266*** 0.220*** 0.269*** 0.211***  0.282*** 0.251*** 0.344*** 0.312*** 
  (0.057) (0.062) (0.056) (0.060)  (0.091) (0.090) (0.102) (0.101) 
Capital  -2.068*** -2.004*** -2.117*** -1.996***  -3.240*** -3.017*** -3.433*** -3.232*** 
  (0.553) (0.546) (0.601) (0.590)  (0.717) (0.711) (0.733) (0.726) 
Surprise  22.640*** 22.545*** 22.909*** 22.810***  12.415*** 12.415*** 12.611*** 12.625*** 
  (1.643) (1.683) (1.644) (1.677)  (1.056) (1.050) (1.049) (1.044) 
Provisions  13.377*** 12.979*** 13.520*** 13.090***  16.468*** 15.755*** 16.495*** 15.796*** 
  (2.134) (2.092) (2.201) (2.163)  (2.254) (2.207) (2.309) (2.275) 
Volatility  5.795*** 5.860*** 5.817*** 5.873***  6.356*** 6.449*** 6.387*** 6.478*** 
  (0.591) (0.594) (0.604) (0.606)  (0.465) (0.469) (0.474) (0.476) 
Analysts  -0.008** -0.007** -0.008** -0.007**  -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)  (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Non-interest   0.377***  0.402***   0.828***  0.830*** 
   (0.127)  (0.127)   (0.237)  (0.215) 
Deposits    0.009 -0.046    0.243* 0.234* 
    (0.095) (0.094)    (0.140) (0.140) 
Constant 1.332*** 1.416*** 0.932** 1.311*** 0.860** 1.253*** -0.610 -0.891** -0.983** -1.249*** 
 (0.247) (0.364) (0.368) (0.343) (0.355) (0.238) (0.448) (0.442) (0.482) (0.482) 
Observations 17321 16215 16215 15745 15745 17321 16215 16215 15745 15745 
Adjusted R2 0.213 0.521 0.522 0.527 0.529 0.237 0.399 0.401 0.406 0.408 
Number of banks 596 592 592 590 590 596 592 592 590 590 
This table presents the OLS and fixed-HIIHFWVHVWLPDWLRQUHVXOWVRIWKHHIIHFWVRIFRPSHWLWLRQRQDQDO\VWV¶IRUHFDVWHUURU0RGHOV-5 present the OLS estimation results, whilst Models 6-10 include bank 
fixed-effects. Time dummies are included in all estimations. Standard error robust to heteroscedasticity and clustering within banks are given in parentheses. The sample and variable definitions are as 
described in Table 1. *, **, *** indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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Table 5: Banking competition and bank opacity ± analysts' forecast dispersion 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS FE FE FE FE FE 
Lerner -0.661*** -0.410*** -0.407*** -0.405*** -0.392*** -0.661*** -0.414*** -0.357*** -0.424*** -0.366*** 
 (0.218) (0.105) (0.104) (0.108) (0.106) (0.123) (0.085) (0.091) (0.085) (0.088) 
Size  0.006 0.010 0.006 0.009  0.025** 0.015 0.026** 0.017 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)  (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Loans  0.126*** 0.109*** 0.124*** 0.104***  0.078** 0.068* 0.087** 0.076* 
  (0.024) (0.026) (0.025) (0.027)  (0.039) (0.038) (0.042) (0.042) 
Capital  -0.724*** -0.701*** -0.755*** -0.712***  -0.835*** -0.752** -0.858*** -0.792** 
  (0.235) (0.233) (0.252) (0.248)  (0.305) (0.306) (0.314) (0.314) 
Surprise  11.156*** 11.122*** 11.232*** 11.198***  7.020*** 7.021*** 7.042*** 7.048*** 
  (0.636) (0.644) (0.639) (0.644)  (0.399) (0.396) (0.402) (0.400) 
Provisions  6.262*** 6.109*** 6.096*** 5.935***  7.950*** 7.661*** 7.848*** 7.576*** 
  (0.911) (0.904) (0.928) (0.922)  (0.905) (0.895) (0.892) (0.889) 
Volatility  1.680*** 1.705*** 1.695*** 1.715***  1.830*** 1.864*** 1.838*** 1.870*** 
  (0.231) (0.231) (0.237) (0.236)  (0.176) (0.178) (0.179) (0.181) 
Analysts  -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000  0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Non-interest   0.129***  0.133**   0.308**  0.297*** 
   (0.050)  (0.054)   (0.120)  (0.100) 
Deposits    0.004 -0.015    0.037 0.036 
    (0.041) (0.042)    (0.065) (0.064) 
Constant 0.417*** 0.030 -0.138 0.396** 0.245 0.545*** -0.167 -0.265 -0.221 -0.311 
 (0.092) (0.119) (0.133) (0.162) (0.168) (0.086) (0.198) (0.208) (0.238) (0.249) 
Observations 14601 14032 14032 13599 13599 14601 14032 14032 13599 13599 
Adjusted R2 0.237 0.589 0.590 0.592 0.593 0.301 0.488 0.490 0.491 0.493 
Number of banks 519 511 511 508 508 519 511 511 508 508 
This table presents the OLS and fixed-effects estimation results of the effects of compHWLWLRQRQDQDO\VWV¶IRUHFDVWGLVSHUVLRQ0RGHOV-5 present the OLS estimation results, whilst Models 6-10 include 
bank fixed effect. Time dummies are included in all estimations. Standard error robust to heteroscedasticity and clustering within banks are given in parentheses. The sample and variable definitions are 
as described in Table 1. *, **, *** indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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Table 6: Banking competition and bank opacity ± opacity score 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS FE FE FE FE FE 
Lerner -0.993*** -0.608*** -0.604*** -0.586*** -0.568*** -0.821*** -0.548*** -0.475*** -0.556*** -0.481*** 
 (0.285) (0.139) (0.136) (0.142) (0.138) (0.162) (0.111) (0.108) (0.111) (0.106) 
Size  0.003 0.009 0.001 0.006  0.030** 0.018 0.032** 0.020 
  (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)  (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Loans  0.148*** 0.125*** 0.141*** 0.113***  0.100** 0.087* 0.110** 0.097* 
  (0.033) (0.035) (0.034) (0.036)  (0.047) (0.046) (0.052) (0.052) 
Capital  -1.016*** -0.987*** -1.025*** -0.966***  -1.137*** -1.033*** -1.165*** -1.078*** 
  (0.308) (0.304) (0.331) (0.324)  (0.375) (0.375) (0.385) (0.385) 
Surprise  13.006*** 12.961*** 13.168*** 13.121***  7.479*** 7.481*** 7.607*** 7.616*** 
  (0.826) (0.838) (0.818) (0.828)  (0.516) (0.513) (0.507) (0.506) 
Provisions  8.788*** 8.589*** 8.529*** 8.306***  9.807*** 9.441*** 9.675*** 9.320*** 
  (1.172) (1.161) (1.187) (1.174)  (1.089) (1.066) (1.085) (1.068) 
Volatility  2.773*** 2.806*** 2.761*** 2.789***  2.976*** 3.019*** 2.963*** 3.004*** 
  (0.298) (0.298) (0.303) (0.303)  (0.228) (0.230) (0.230) (0.231) 
Analysts  -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002  -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Non-interest   0.168**  0.184***   0.389***  0.388*** 
   (0.065)  (0.070)   (0.136)  (0.117) 
Deposits    -0.016 -0.044    0.040 0.039 
    (0.056) (0.056)    (0.079) (0.078) 
Constant 0.521*** 0.095 -0.124 0.637*** 0.428** 0.663*** -0.170 -0.294 -0.246 -0.364 
 (0.109) (0.152) (0.168) (0.199) (0.207) (0.113) (0.220) (0.223) (0.247) (0.255) 
Observations 14601 14032 14032 13599 13599 14601 14032 14032 13599 13599 
Adjusted R2 0.225 0.597 0.598 0.602 0.603 0.292 0.493 0.494 0.499 0.501 
Number of banks 519 511 511 508 508 519 511 511 508 508 
This table presents the OLS and fixed-effects estimation results of the effects of competition on opacity score. Models 2-5 present the OLS estimation results, whilst Models 6-10 include bank fixed 
effect. Time dummies are included in all estimations. Standard error robust to heteroscedasticity and clustering within banks are given in parentheses. The sample and variable definitions are as 
described in Table 1. *, **, *** indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
. 
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Table 7: Banking competition and bank opacity ± two-stage least square 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
 Forecast error  Forecast dispersion  Opacity score 
 First-stage Second-stage  First-stage Second-stage  First-stage Second-stage 
Dependent variable Lerner Forecast error  Lerner Forecast 
dispersion 
 Lerner Forecast score 
Inefficiencyt-1 -0.863***   -0.857***   -0.857***  
 (0.048)   (0.053)   (0.053)  
Lernert-2 0.079***   0.085***   0.085***  
 (0.025)   (0.027)   (0.027)  
Lerner  -1.135***   -0.402***   -0.573*** 
  (0.266)   (0.099)   (0.121) 
Size 0.013*** 0.064**  0.014*** 0.017  0.014*** 0.020 
 (0.002) (0.028)  (0.002) (0.013)  (0.002) (0.015) 
Loans 0.014** 0.326***  0.015** 0.076*  0.015** 0.100* 
 (0.007) (0.102)  (0.007) (0.042)  (0.007) (0.052) 
Capital -0.030 -3.161***  -0.029 -0.772**  -0.029 -1.046*** 
 (0.025) (0.727)  (0.027) (0.314)  (0.027) (0.384) 
Surprise 0.002 12.549***  0.002 7.029***  0.002 7.587*** 
 (0.011) (1.043)  (0.013) (0.398)  (0.013) (0.504) 
Provisions -0.033 15.938***  -0.052 7.610***  -0.052 9.388*** 
 (0.053) (2.315)  (0.058) (0.901)  (0.058) (1.087) 
Volatility 0.006 6.478***  0.008 1.873***  0.008 3.009*** 
 (0.005) (0.475)  (0.005) (0.180)  (0.005) (0.230) 
Analysts -0.000** -0.003  -0.000** 0.001  -0.000** -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.002)  (0.000) (0.001)  (0.000) (0.001) 
Non-interest -0.013 0.821***  -0.014 0.298***  -0.014 0.384*** 
 (0.013) (0.215)  (0.014) (0.100)  (0.014) (0.117) 
Deposits 0.008 0.277**  0.009 0.043  0.009 0.057 
 (0.008) (0.137)  (0.008) (0.065)  (0.008) (0.078) 
Observations 15599 15599  13487 13487  13487 13487 
Adjusted R2  0.385   0.473   0.482 
Number of banks 551 551  477 477  477 477 
Kleibergen-Paap F stat.  374.527   305.438   305.438 
Hansen J p-value  0.605   0.161   0.353 
This table presents the two-VWDJHHVWLPDWLRQUHVXOWVRIWKHHIIHFWVRIFRPSHWLWLRQRQDQDO\VWV¶forecast error, forecast dispersion and opacity score. Models 1, 3 and 5 present the results of the first-stage 
regressions, whilst Models 2, 4 and 6 present the results of the corresponding second-stage regressions. Time dummies are included in all estimations. Standard error robust to heteroscedasticity and 
clustering within banks are given in parentheses. Inefficiency is the ratio of overheads to income. The sample and variable definitions are as described in Table 1. *, **, *** indicate significance at 1%, 
5% and 10% respectively. 
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Table 8: Banking competition and bank opacity ± Controlling for analysts' characteristics 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Dependent 
variable 
Forecast 
error 
Forecast 
error 
Forecast 
error 
Forecast 
error 
Forecast 
dispersion 
Forecast 
dispersion 
Forecast 
dispersion 
Forecast 
dispersion 
Opacity 
score 
Opacity 
score 
Opacity 
score 
Opacity 
score 
Lerner -0.898*** -0.904*** -0.906*** -0.898*** -0.366*** -0.366*** -0.366*** -0.365*** -0.481*** -0.481*** -0.481*** -0.480*** 
 (0.236) (0.235) (0.236) (0.235) (0.089) (0.088) (0.088) (0.088) (0.106) (0.106) (0.106) (0.106) 
Size 0.065** 0.061** 0.064** 0.062** 0.018 0.017 0.017 0.016 0.021 0.020 0.020 0.019 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Loans 0.315*** 0.311*** 0.316*** 0.312*** 0.078* 0.077* 0.077* 0.077* 0.098* 0.097* 0.098* 0.097* 
 (0.100) (0.101) (0.101) (0.100) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) 
Capital -3.248*** -3.221*** -3.223*** -3.203*** -0.801** -0.792** -0.792** -0.794** -1.091*** -1.077*** -1.078*** -1.078*** 
 (0.727) (0.725) (0.725) (0.724) (0.314) (0.314) (0.314) (0.314) (0.386) (0.385) (0.385) (0.385) 
Surprise 12.631*** 12.614*** 12.633*** 12.600*** 7.052*** 7.049*** 7.050*** 7.045*** 7.620*** 7.615*** 7.620*** 7.612*** 
 (1.045) (1.044) (1.044) (1.044) (0.400) (0.400) (0.400) (0.400) (0.505) (0.505) (0.505) (0.505) 
Provisions 15.905*** 15.761*** 15.781*** 15.788*** 7.609*** 7.577*** 7.573*** 7.595*** 9.366*** 9.317*** 9.309*** 9.331*** 
 (2.272) (2.274) (2.276) (2.271) (0.888) (0.889) (0.889) (0.888) (1.065) (1.066) (1.068) (1.065) 
Volatility 6.472*** 6.478*** 6.462*** 6.460*** 1.867*** 1.870*** 1.869*** 1.868*** 3.000*** 3.004*** 3.000*** 2.998*** 
 (0.476) (0.476) (0.475) (0.474) (0.180) (0.181) (0.181) (0.180) (0.231) (0.231) (0.231) (0.231) 
Analysts -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Non-interest 0.819*** 0.831*** 0.838*** 0.823*** 0.293*** 0.297*** 0.297*** 0.292*** 0.383*** 0.388*** 0.389*** 0.382*** 
 (0.214) (0.215) (0.214) (0.214) (0.100) (0.100) (0.100) (0.100) (0.117) (0.117) (0.117) (0.117) 
Deposits 0.223 0.236* 0.239* 0.234* 0.035 0.036 0.037 0.036 0.037 0.040 0.041 0.040 
 (0.140) (0.140) (0.140) (0.140) (0.064) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.078) (0.079) (0.078) (0.079) 
Experience -0.029***   -0.035*** -0.010***   -0.013*** -0.014***   -0.018*** 
 (0.009)   (0.009) (0.004)   (0.005) (0.005)   (0.005) 
Length  0.004  0.014***  -0.000  0.003  0.000  0.005* 
  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Scope   -0.050** -0.035   -0.003 0.003   -0.011 -0.003 
   (0.022) (0.023)   (0.008) (0.009)   (0.010) (0.011) 
Constant -1.047** -1.257*** -1.147** -0.962** -0.236 -0.311 -0.304 -0.227 -0.257 -0.364 -0.341 -0.234 
 (0.491) (0.483) (0.486) (0.488) (0.251) (0.249) (0.250) (0.252) (0.259) (0.255) (0.256) (0.258) 
Observations 15745 15745 15745 15745 13599 13599 13599 13599 13599 13599 13599 13599 
Adjusted R2 0.408 0.408 0.408 0.408 0.493 0.493 0.493 0.493 0.501 0.500 0.501 0.501 
Number of banks 590 590 590 590 508 508 508 508 508 508 508 508 
This table presents the fixed-effects HVWLPDWLRQUHVXOWVRIWKHHIIHFWVRIFRPSHWLWLRQRQDQDO\VWV¶IRUHFDVWHUURUIRUHFDVWGLVSHUVLRQDQGopacity score. Models 2-5 present the OLS estimation results, 
whilst Models 6-10 include bank fixed effect. Time dummies are included in all estimations. Standard error robust to heteroscedasticity and clustering within banks are given in parentheses. The sample 
and variable definitions are as described in Table 1. *, **, *** indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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Table 9: Banking competition and bank opacity ± Crisis subsamples 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Forecast error Forecast error Forecast error Forecast 
dispersion 
Forecast 
dispersion 
Forecast 
dispersion 
Opacity score Opacity score Opacity score 
Lerner -1.534*** -0.496** -0.854*** -0.467*** -0.268*** -0.288** -0.686*** -0.315*** -0.393*** 
 (0.350) (0.200) (0.311) (0.127) (0.090) (0.131) (0.152) (0.096) (0.139) 
Size 0.059** 0.057** 0.056** 0.016 0.015 0.015 0.018 0.017 0.017 
 (0.027) (0.028) (0.028) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) 
Loans 0.299*** 0.276*** 0.274*** 0.074* 0.068 0.068 0.091* 0.082 0.081 
 (0.099) (0.100) (0.099) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) 
Capital -3.172*** -3.184*** -3.171*** -0.794** -0.799** -0.799** -1.079*** -1.087*** -1.087*** 
 (0.710) (0.709) (0.704) (0.313) (0.312) (0.312) (0.381) (0.380) (0.379) 
Surprise 12.465*** 12.315*** 12.288*** 7.025*** 6.981*** 6.979*** 7.571*** 7.503*** 7.497*** 
 (1.046) (1.041) (1.043) (0.397) (0.398) (0.398) (0.503) (0.502) (0.501) 
Provisions 15.399*** 15.958*** 15.749*** 7.539*** 7.647*** 7.637*** 9.218*** 9.420*** 9.378*** 
 (2.248) (2.231) (2.219) (0.883) (0.881) (0.880) (1.060) (1.049) (1.050) 
Volatility 6.442*** 6.438*** 6.433*** 1.863*** 1.862*** 1.861*** 2.989*** 2.988*** 2.986*** 
 (0.471) (0.469) (0.468) (0.181) (0.180) (0.180) (0.230) (0.229) (0.229) 
Analysts -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Non-interest 0.830*** 0.774*** 0.784*** 0.295*** 0.282*** 0.283*** 0.387*** 0.365*** 0.368*** 
 (0.212) (0.213) (0.212) (0.100) (0.101) (0.100) (0.116) (0.117) (0.117) 
Deposits 0.222 0.197 0.196 0.033 0.027 0.027 0.034 0.026 0.025 
 (0.136) (0.137) (0.136) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.078) (0.079) (0.079) 
Experience -0.034*** -0.034*** -0.034*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.018*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Length 0.013** 0.013** 0.013** 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.005* 0.005 0.005 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Scope -0.032 -0.035 -0.034 0.004 0.003 0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Lerner x Pre-crisis 1.392***  0.666* 0.230  0.037 0.464**  0.151 
 (0.383)  (0.363) (0.152)  (0.145) (0.187)  (0.173) 
Pre-crisis -1.000***  -0.540** -0.238**  -0.116 -0.387***  -0.187* 
 (0.255)  (0.239) (0.096)  (0.093) (0.118)  (0.109) 
Lerner x crisis  -2.451*** -2.128***  -0.588** -0.570**  -1.001*** -0.929*** 
  (0.602) (0.606)  (0.253) (0.261)  (0.313) (0.315) 
Crisis  1.504*** 1.291***  0.426*** 0.414***  0.665*** 0.618*** 
  (0.297) (0.309)  (0.131) (0.140)  (0.159) (0.163) 
Constant -0.496 -1.053** -0.818 -0.148 -0.247 -0.234 -0.076 -0.268 -0.215 
 (0.519) (0.485) (0.512) (0.260) (0.256) (0.267) (0.270) (0.262) (0.273) 
Observations 15745 15745 15745 13599 13599 13599 13599 13599 13599 
Adjusted R2 0.410 0.412 0.412 0.493 0.494 0.494 0.502 0.503 0.503 
Number of banks 590 590 590 508 508 508 508 508 508 
This table presents the fixed-effects HVWLPDWLRQUHVXOWVRIWKHHIIHFWVRIFRPSHWLWLRQRQDQDO\VWV¶IRUHFDVWHUURUIRUHFDVWGLVSHUVLRQDQGopacity score. Models 2-5 present the OLS estimation results, whilst Models 6-10 include bank fixed effect. Time dummies are included 
in all estimations. Standard error robust to heteroscedasticity and clustering within banks are given in parentheses. The sample and variable definitions are as described in Table 1. *, **, *** indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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Table 10: Banking competition and bank opacity ± addressing state-quarter fixed effects 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 AFE FDISP Score 
Lerner -1.126*** -0.369*** -0.528*** 
 (0.268) (0.088) (0.119) 
Size 0.048 0.015 0.020 
 (0.033) (0.015) (0.018) 
Loans 0.163 0.030 0.033 
 (0.105) (0.046) (0.061) 
Capital -1.900*** -0.550* -0.681* 
 (0.730) (0.330) (0.406) 
Surprise 8.333*** 4.663*** 5.062*** 
 (0.909) (0.341) (0.441) 
Provisions 5.651** 2.458*** 2.774** 
 (2.244) (0.852) (1.115) 
Volatility 4.391*** 1.081*** 1.884*** 
 (0.414) (0.145) (0.189) 
Analysts -0.006** -0.002* -0.003* 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) 
Non-interest 0.800*** 0.313*** 0.419*** 
 (0.183) (0.073) (0.088) 
Deposits 0.150 -0.042 -0.036 
 (0.160) (0.076) (0.095) 
Constant -1.533*** -0.454* -0.624** 
 (0.558) (0.263) (0.317) 
Observations 15748 13601 13601 
Adjusted R2 0.125 0.147 0.162 
Number of banks 590 508 508 
This table presents the fixed-effect estimation results of the effects of cRPSHWLWLRQRQDQDO\VWV¶IRUHFDVWHUURUIRUHFDVWGLVSHUVLRQ
and opacity score. Lerner index and opacity are state-quarter mean-adjusted in all models. Standard error robust to 
heteroscedasticity and clustering within bank are given in parentheses. The sample and variable definitions are as described in 
Table 1. *, **, *** indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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Table 11: Banking competition and bank opacity ± using a measure of competition at the banking market level 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 AFE FDISP SCORE 
Lerner -0.887*** -0.450** -0.513*** 
 (0.332) (0.176) (0.184) 
Size 0.044 0.009 0.010 
 (0.028) (0.013) (0.014) 
Loans 0.282*** 0.066 0.082 
 (0.101) (0.042) (0.052) 
Capital -3.387*** -0.850*** -1.159*** 
 (0.715) (0.312) (0.380) 
Surprise 12.705*** 7.074*** 7.653*** 
 (1.044) (0.400) (0.504) 
Provisions 15.920*** 7.618*** 9.386*** 
 (2.286) (0.892) (1.069) 
Volatility 6.480*** 1.867*** 3.000*** 
 (0.478) (0.181) (0.232) 
Analysts -0.002 0.001 -0.000 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Non-interest 0.928*** 0.332*** 0.438*** 
 (0.219) (0.099) (0.119) 
Deposits 0.184 0.018 0.013 
 (0.139) (0.065) (0.078) 
Constant -0.960* -0.134 -0.178 
 (0.527) (0.287) (0.289) 
Observations 15745 13599 13599 
Adjusted R2 0.406 0.492 0.499 
Number of banks 590 508 508 
This table presents the fixed-effects HVWLPDWLRQUHVXOWVRIWKHHIIHFWVRIFRPSHWLWLRQRQDQDO\VWV¶IRUHFDVWHUURUIRUHFDVWGLVSHUVLRQDQGRSDFLW\VFRUH
Lerner index is measured at the state level for each year-quarter in all models. Standard error robust to heteroscedasticity and clustering within 
banks are given in parentheses. The sample and variable definitions are as described in Table 1. *, **, *** indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
